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On Instruments and Aesthetics
A Possible Deweyan Inconsistency
Steven A. Miller
1 Despite rumors to the contrary, tradition still matters. Determining in what ways we do
and should relate to our traditions is an issue of central importance for philosophy in
general and for the philosophy of technology in particular. After all, most attempts at
understanding the epochal  trends  of  human history  involve  reference to  how newly
developed and deployed tools  and techniques  reshape the  traditional  ways  in  which
people have been able to understand their world and,  consequently,  themselves.  One
contemporary philosopher of technology who is prominent for being concerned about
the  status  of  tradition  is  Albert  Borgmann,  notably  in  his  writings  on  “the  device
paradigm” and its consequences for our “focal things and practices,” which he relates to
“matters of ultimate concern.”
2 A recently published article in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy argues that the key
insights Borgmann offers on the relationship between our tools and our world- and self-
understanding have been overlooked in Larry A.  Hickman’s  exposition of  a  Deweyan
philosophy of technology. The author, Eric Mullis, suggests that if Borgmann’s position
“were given a  fair  shake,  Hickman would need to spend much more time defending
Dewey’s philosophy of technology” (Mullis,  2009: 110), especially because “a thorough
consideration of the device paradigm reveals an inconsistency in Dewey’s philosophy”
(Mullis,  2009:  116).  My  contention  is  that  Hickman  has  sincerely  engaged  with
Borgmann’s work, though not in a way that directly addresses the putative tension in
Dewey’s thought Mullis indicates. As such, my tasks here are to give a charitable and
initially uncritical presentation of Borgmann’s “focaltechnic” philosophy of technology,
to highlight how Hickman has replied to much of the Borgmann-inspired criticism Mullis
offers,  and  then  to  show  how  two  elements  of  Dewey’s  thought  –  in  this  case,  his
instrumentalism and his aesthetics – are in fact consistent. This second objective is the
real payoff of the argument since it  stands to address the longstanding concern that
pragmatism  can  be  reduced  to  a  crass  form  of  instrumentalism;  wedding  Dewey’s
instrumentalism to his aesthetics in a closer fashion makes such a reduction impossible.
The Hickman-Mullis debate in contemporary pragmatist scholarship provides a suitable
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occasion to  make this  important  point  concerning the relationship between classical
pragmatism and technology.
 
How the “Device Paradigm” Threatens Things and
Practices
3 Throughout much of his published work, Albert Borgmann has been troubled by what he
terms the “device paradigm.” In Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life, the book
in  which  Borgmann  initially  presented  his  worries  about  present-day  technological
culture, he writes that the device paradigm is the pattern that “inheres in the dominant
way in which we in the modern era have been taking up with the world” (Borgmann,
1984:  3).  Elsewhere,  Borgmann  explains  that  “the  conjunction  of  machinery  and
commodity [is] a technological device,” which he contrasts with ‘things’: “a thing… has an
intelligible  and  accessible  character  and  calls  forth  skilled  and  active  human
engagement” (Borgmann, 1995: 90). He argues that the proliferation of devices rather
than things in the contemporary era has limited our ability to achieve the good life.
4 On this characterization, devices invite their users to passivity and consumption, in part
because  complex  machinery  often  stands  in  for  human activity.  By  contrast,  things
require  active  engagement,  especially  skillful  and  deliberate  practice.  Borgmann
identifies technologies such as the stereo, television, and Bic pen as archetypical devices.
The wood axe, fountain pen, and bass tuba fall within his category of thing. He sees each
of the tools in the former set as limited and limiting, while use of those in the latter group
encourage  growth,  especially  in  skillfulness,  and  engagement.  This  claim  is  made
primarily in terms of “availability”: “goods that are available to us enrich our lives and, if
they are technologically available, they do so without imposing burdens on us. Something
is available in this sense if it has been rendered instantaneous, ubiquitous, safe, and easy”
(Borgmann,  1984:  41).  But  things  and  devices  are  not  on  equal  footing  regarding
availability: “availability is realized by… devices” (Verbeek, 2005: 177). As time has gone
on and new tools and techniques have been developed, devices have multiplied. Devices
are ubiquitious, easily understood, and easy to use. They are available in the senses of
being both easily attainable and easy to deploy. The ready-made, the kitschy, and the
foolproof  are  those  categories  which Borgmann has  in  mind when he  speaks  of  the
availability of devices.
5 His paradigmatic example of historical changes in availability, warmth, clearly shows the
contrast:  in  our  device-centric  culture,  one  can have  warmth at  the  spin  of  a  wall-
mounted  dial.  A  quick  flick  of  the  wrist  causes  behind-the-wall  and  below-the-floor
machinery to kick into action, heating the surrounding environment without additional
engagement necessary.  The achievement of warmth in a thing-based culture involves
tromping through snowbanks, wielding sharp axes, dodging falling timber, and avoiding
bears. In this situated process, the individual is engaged from first to last, and he or she
must take both time and risks in order to achieve the sought end. Further, so Borgmann’s
story goes, developing competency in device-based warmth-acquisition is significantly
easier than learning to swing an axe without hurting oneself,  which leads to further
passivity. This distinction is then one about the engagement and strenuousness of life.
6 Because of the self-cultivation implicitly required by difficult-to-use things, and because
things  definitionally  involve  active  engagement,  Borgmann  claims  that  things  make
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available  multiple  interrelated  possibilities  and  results.  Heading  into  the  forest  for
firewood rewards and develops skill in navigation, axemanship, dexterity, forestry, and
many other  practices.  The able  woodsperson’s  body is  exercised through hiking and
chopping, and he or she may well have an aesthetic experience while deciding just which
tree  to  fell.  In  contradistinction,  because  devices  are  readymade  and  thus  quick  to
present their effective applications, which are almost always more limited in scope and
number than those of things, many fewer engaged and integrated outcomes are produced
in device-use. When one activates a thermostat, one receives the desired warmth and
only the slightest of finger-exercises as peripheral benefit.
7 On Borgmann’s view, the most important technologies, which are consequently also those
most displaced by the contemporary world’s glut of devices, are those tools he terms
“focal things and practices” (Borgmann, 1984: 201).1 These are called focal because he
“does not want technology to be ‘enclosed in boundaries’ but to be ‘related to a center’.
The center… would be provided by what he calls ‘focal things and practices’” (Verbeek,
2005:  183-84).  These  boundaries  and  their  implicit  segmentation  of  life  are,  on  his
account, paradigmatically present in devices: the pruning clippers for cutting bushes, the
kitchen  shears  for  cutting  meat,  the  office  scissors  for  cutting  paper.2 Focal  things,
however, are things which have diverse consequences, require skill, and provide order
and orientation for the rest of life. He goes on to explain that these things are normally
tied up with our aesthetic sensibilities. The fireplace, which requires attentive tending
and supplies  a  comfortable aura in which people can read or  knit  while  chatting,  is
emblematic of this kind of thing, as are the practices of distance running and gardening.
In all cases, focal technologies “require a practice to prosper within” (Borgmann, 1984:
196), and these practices provide the contexts which, he suggests, better center life than
those involving more prevalent disposable, single-application, easy-to-use devices3. The
computerized tools  of  the  information age –  which he argues  sometimes  operate  by
substituting information for reality, so that we treat “information as reality” – are his
most recent target, and they seem to be devices par excellence, devices that apparently
both disengage and confound their users. This occurs because “information gets more
and more detached from reality and in the end is offered as something that rivals and
replaces reality” (Borgmann, 1999:  182),  which has led some of Borgmann’s critics to
claim that he believes “digitally generated information is incapable of making a positive
contribution to culture” (Cooper, 2004: 100).
8 Borgmann accepts  that  tools  and techniques  were  initially  developed,  in  a  Baconian
spirit, “to protect us from hunger, cold, disease, darkness, confinement, and exertion”
(Borgmann, 1984: 140). Unfortunately, though, our culture’s switch from predominately
using things to almost exclusively employing devices has left humans feeling and being
disconnected  from  their  world,  from  each  other,  and  from  themselves.  Peter-Paul
Verbeek links this claim with some of those made by Karl  Jaspers,  “who decried the
emergence of ‘mass existence’ in which human beings only consume mass-manufactured
products  and  have  no  true  ties  with  the  world”  (Verbeek,  2005:  180).  Borgmann’s
contention is that it is only through counter-culture development of context-dependent
and orientation-shaping focal practices that humanity can retie itself to its world and
overcome the limitations by way of alienation and disengagement that are implicit in the
device  paradigm.  I  call  this  conditionally  necessary  development  “counter-culture”
because  Borgmann  is  clear  that  he  is  after  “the  recognition  and  the  restraint of  the
paradigm”  (Borgmann,  1984:  220),  a  phrase  that  makes  obvious  that  this  correction
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cannot come exclusively from within the device paradigm. It should by now be clear that,
in Verbeek’s words, “Borgmann’s analysis of the technological mediation of existence is
somber”  (Verbeek,  2005:  179).  Other  philosophers  of  technology,  including  Larry
A. Hickman,  have  pushed  back  on  this  gloomy  outlook.  As  Hickman’s  responses  are
explored,  especially  in  light  of  Eric  Mullis’s  criticisms,  further  details  of  Borgmann’s
sketched position will become apparent.
 
A Pragmatic Take on “Focaltechnics”
9 Mullis’s main complaint is not that Hickman has gotten Borgmann wrong but instead that
he missed what is most important about Borgmann’s analysis. It is worth noting that after
referencing chapter 6 of Philosophical Tools for Technological Culture (“Literacy, Mediacy,
and Technological Determinism”), “Hickman’s most sustained discussion of Borgmann,”
Mullis  agrees  with  the  argument  presented  there:  “Borgmann is  a  reductionist  who
believes that information technology determines human behavior” (Mullis,  2009: 111).
But he is concerned “that Borgmann’s most significant contribution to the philosophy of
technology has been overlooked” (ibid.). Specifically, Borgmann insists that devices drive
a wedge between ends and means, hiding how chosen ends come about. On a Deweyan
view, few charges are more disastrous; after all, thinkers like Hickman, as philosophers of
continuity, repeatedly argue that ends and means must be transactional and reciprocal.
Mullis’s  worry amounts to a claim that Hickman has trivialized his engagement with
Borgmann, an accusation that, if true, would cast a poor light on Hickman’s work and
potentially undermine his reading of pragmatism , which continues to hold sway in many
philosophical camps.
10 In the introduction to this paper, I referred to Borgmann’s philosophy of technology as
“focaltechnic.”  This  term,  which  nicely  mentions  the  basic  commitment  of  his
philosophy,  was not  coined by me.  Rather,  it  was first  used by Hickman in his  2000
“Focaltechnics, Pragmatechnics, and the Reform of Technology,” an essay in which he
locates  his  pragmatic  theory  of  technology  in  relation  to  Borgmann’s  tripartite
distinction  between  substantive,  instrumentalist,  and  pluralist  philosophies  of
technology. A significant portion of Hickman’s work in this piece is explaining where the
specifics of his pragmatic philosophy are at odds with Borgmann’s allegiance to focal
practices as the antidote to our contemporary ills.4
11 After giving an explanation of Borgmann’s frustration with the device paradigm similar
to that which I offered in section one of this paper, Mullis uses up-to-date technological
examples to show how the deleterious effects of device-culture have become even more
insidious than previously thought. In place of Borgmann’s example of the stereo, a device
which has  made music  “a  disembodied,  freefloating  something,  a  commodity  that  is
instantly, ubiquitously, and easily available” (Borgmann, 1995: 89), Mullis offers the iPod,
which is not bulky and is even freer of obvious machinery. The rise of tiny but long-
lasting  batteries  has  made  us  able  to  take  our  devices  with  us,  freeing  them  from
whatever slight contextual-dependency they retained by needing to be plugged in for use.
This surely bolsters Borgmann’s worry about disembodied, free-floating commodities.
12 Mullis points to focal things and practices as simultaneously endangered by and yet able
to overcome the device paradigm. Following Borgmann, he shows the promise of focal
practices  by  describing  the  differences  between  home-cooked  meals  and  microwave
dinners: “The microwave dinner and the microwave efficiently provide a hot, tasty meal;
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however,  one  who  relies  heavily  on  the  device  for  food  production  loses  out  on
interaction with the means that go into food production since the device takes care of
them.” In contrast,  Mullis suggests,  “when someone takes the time to cook food, the
human–reality interaction is greater. The cook must be engaged in that he must know the
nature of the foods, know how to prepare them, know suitable combinations of different
foods, and know the tastes of those he cooks for (including himself).” On this account, the
microwave encourages disconnection from the process of production, and other means of
cooking do quite the opposite. Mullis goes on to explain in detail what he hints at in the
previous quotation: the real value of cooking is found in how it, unlike readymade TV
dinners, encourages working, eating, and communicating together. Focal practices can –
if they are allowed – break up consumer culture by ensuring attention to life’s social
dimensions.
13 Hickman gives this line of thinking its due: “Only a few true-believer free-marketeers
would want to disagree with [Borgmann’s] claim that most of us in Western industrialized
countries  have  a  tendency  to  get  too  tightly  locked  into  patterns  of  consumption”
(Hickman,  2000:  89-90).  But  he also  stresses  that  Borgmann “has  cast  the net  of  his
condemnation of the device paradigm too broadly. He tends to do this by reducing the
many and varied functions of certain devices to one essential property” (Hickman, 2000:
93).  Microwaves  are  for  speedy,  thoughtless  cooking;  televisions  are  for  wasting
weekends  in  vegetative  stupor.  There  seems  to  be  a  real  inattention  to  the  wider
possibilities of the ways we can deploy devices.
14 The matter of essences is clearly important because, taking up the microwave/cooked
meal distinction, we can see that Mullis falls into the same trap that Hickman diagnosed
in Borgmann. On Mullis’s account, the microwave user loses out on food production, “the
microwave can reliably produce warm food at any time” (Mullis, 2009: 113), and the cook
cares about the preferences of those for whom he or she cooks. Quite a bit of idealization
– of both utopic and dystopic sorts – has occurred in Mullis’s presentation. Though the
microwave can be used to heat up prepackaged meals, it can also be one more tool in a
chef’s home-cooking arsenal, especially valuable for those people without the financial
means or physical space to acquire and maintain an oven. Though the microwave does
not always require interaction with much in the way of food production, the microwave
can only  reliably  produce warm food if  one has  engaged in  a  different  sort  of  food
preparation:  shopping.  And  though  an  ideal  cook  may  always  be  attentive  to  the
gustatory proclivities of his or her diners, most readers are sure to remember more than
one childhood instance of parents requiring they eat meals that, though prepared with
them in mind, they found disgusting.
15 Because of examples like these, cases in which the quick and easy distinction between
good things and bad devices becomes suspect, we must resist Borgmann’s essentialism
and instead agree with Hickman’s pragmatechnic commitment “that we put an end to
speaking  of  tools...  as  having  complete  essences  that  predetermine  and  provide  the
measure of our ways of involvement with them. [He] suggest[s] that we instead speak of
the ways in which [tools] can and do serve to enhance delight and to resolve problems,
that  is,  to  enlarge  the  meanings  of  our  experiences”  (Hickman,  2001:  122).  There  is
something a bit too neat about Borgmann’s analysis, and it frequently requires us to move
to an unacceptable level of imaginative abstraction to see the relevance of his claims for
our lives. I suspect Borgmann would blame this on the ubiquity of the device paradigm,
but I would instead point to the varied ways in which our tools are understood and can be
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used. In light of this, “a flexible functionalism,” Hickman suggests, will “take us further
down the road to understanding the complexities of our technological milieu” (Hickman,
2000: 93).
16 Though Borgmann offers a Neo-Heideggerian critique, Hickman is careful to distinguish
between this position and that of Heidegger, who “apparently wanted to go all the way
back to stone bridges, [whereas] Borgmann says he wants to go forward by going only
part of the way back, to acoustical instruments and home cooking” (Hickman, 2000: 92).
While Hickman’s criticism of Heidegger may be a little too glib, there is still something
right about his suspicion of the impulsion or motivation of Borgmann’s critique.  The
particular cultural space from which Borgmann seemingly exclusively draws his focal
things and practices is a point of some concern for Hickman, and this returns to the very
first  sentences of  this  essay.  Though he does not  say as  much,  Borgmann is  at  least
implicitly concerned with maintaining tradition.
17 The items Borgmann identifies as things, and especially focal things, can often give us
different  ways  of  interacting  with  our  world.  They  can challenge  us  to  take  up  the
strenuous life, working hard and thoughtfully to achieve our chosen aims. But they do
not always do so, and they may in fact frustrate our hopes of fuller and more meaningful
lives. Frequently it seems that the justification for orienting and carrying out our lives in
terms of these practices he offers is traditionalistic: because an item or practice worked
well in the past,  it  can also work well  today, and thus we should again adopt it.  For
instance: for generations, some people cooked meals together and then sat down to eat at
a  family  table.  And  for  many  of  these  people,  these  occasions  were  important  and
provided structure to their lives. The habits necessary to use things, such as the oven and
the  frying  pan,  are  often  learned  from  parents,  passed  down  from  generation  to
generation. In this way, they become constitutive of a tradition, a shared and inherited
way of using things well. Though they are not always immediately intuitive in their use,
devices do not demand the same degree of training. In part because of this difference,
devices can undermine and even eliminate traditional ways of engaging with the world.
This fact by itself is neither an occasion for celebration or for mourning.
18 While  traditional  lives  lived  in  terms  of  things  demand  education  and  care,  the
traditionalistic bias can serve to cover over ways in which tradition frustrates. Cooking in
this way requires active attention and skillful habits, yes, but it also sometimes served to
limit  meaningful  lives,  as  the  mostly-uncompensated time needed for  this  work was
expected  and  demanded  of  a limited  set  of  people  (most  often  women).  Tradition
functions as a repository of useful practices, and thus we may appreciate it for showing us
what ways of being have worked well and have been important in the past. In this way,
traditions  are  consonant  with  what  Dewey  referred  to  as  the  funded  character  of
experience: some elements of human life are meaningful and interpretable primarily in
terms of earlier experiences, including those of the cultures in which we were formed.
But  cultural  tradition  must  never  be  accepted  uncritically,  and  practices  –  focal  or
otherwise – cannot be understood and should not be implemented without attention to
the  full  breadth  of  their  consequences,  including  who  is  and  may  be  excluded  and
restricted  in  the  process.  An  appropriate  attitude  toward  tradition  is  then  one  of
conscientious consideration: the value of tradition must be continually reevaluated and
reestablished.
19 While  Borgmann’s  forbearer  Heidegger  was  almost  surely  right  about  the  work  of
enframing that occurs with modern technologies, simply going back to an earlier time
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will not salve our present condition. There are two reasons to believe this: first, such a
return ignores the progressive elements that have come with technological development.
No  longer  is  one  half  of  the  population  expected  to  stay  at  home,  tasked  with  the
necessary  work  of  replenishing  and reproducing  labor.  Second,  and  more  strikingly,
expecting such a return on a large scale is simply unrealistic. Devices are here to stay, and
so  we  must  find  the  best  and  most  productive  ways  to  integrate  them  into  our
contemporary lives, to reconstruct their uses for our purposes. Mullis surprisingly does
not seem to pick up on and resist this throwback strand in Borgmann’s thought, despite
his apparent comfort of conceptual and applied use of high-tech, present day devices like
iPods and laptops. I take this to mean that he is attentive to my second concern about
feasibility but inattentive to the first.
20 This, coupled with Mullis’s idealization of focal practices, is very problematic, because it
means that he joins Borgmann in having “given too much weight to the integrity of focal
things and practices” (Hickman, 2000: 93). At one point late in his article, Mullis invokes
Deweyan experimentalism when he writes,  “technological artifacts such as iPods,  cell
phones,  microwaves,  computers,  and  television  sets  are  just  the  fruits  of  intelligent
inquiry. They reflect the resolution of problematic situations and allow us to function and
flourish”  (Mullis,  2009:  115).  On  an  initial  read,  this  quotation  shows  that  Mullis  is
attentive to the origins of tools, but it is very strange that the artifacts he lists are all,
from  the  Borgmannian  perspective,  devices!  Surely  his  article  is  concerned  with
instrumentalism in the device paradigm, but it unclear why he would not include at least
one  obvious  Borgmannian  thing,  let  alone  a  potential  focal  thing,  in  his  catalog  of
exemplary fruits of intelligent inquiry. At best, this is an unfortunate slip; at worst, it
means  Mullis  intends  to  place  focal  things  in  some other  category.  Given the  broad
conception of intelligent inquiry found in Hickman’s work, this would be a strange move
to  make.  From  this  brief  article,  it  is  unclear  whether  Mullis  is  committed  to  the
untestability  of  focal  practices,  a  major  point  of  division  between  Borgmann  and
Hickman, but that he utilizes the same customary examples for focal things as Borgmann
and then fails to number them among the results of productive inquiry is suggestive.
21 I  take  the  question  of  whether  focal  things  and  practices  can  be  brought  under
experimental  scrutiny to be the most significant disagreement between Hickman and
Borgmann. Hickman acknowledges the consonance between his philosophy of technology
and Borgmann’s before insisting on this important difference:
Like focaltechnics, pragmatechnics holds that focal things and practices generally
do  have  to  do  with  aesthetic  experience,  sympathy,  and  enthusiasm.  Unlike
focaltechnics, however, pragmatechnics holds that we sometimes need to examine
our enthusiasms, aesthetic experiences, and sympathies, to subject them to tests of
relevance and fruitfulness, and then to honor the ones that serve common goals
and to reject the ones that are unproductive because they are based on what is
merely personal or sectarian. (Hickman, 2000: 95-6)
22 Because this dispute has been the subject of a decades-long exchange of arguments, it will
not  be  possible  to  present  much  here  except  a  very  brief  summary.  Hickman
characterizes their disagreement as one between seeing focal practices as “testable on the
one side and contestable and attestable on the other” (Hickman, 2000: 99). Borgmann
explains his concern this way: “if values are testable, then there must be strategic or
higher-order values that are firm and tell us whether our tactical or first-order values
that are being tested at the moment will serve as effective means for the strategic ends.
(This is an unresolved and longstanding issue between Hickman and me; see my 1992:
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345-347)”  (Borgmann,  2003:  31).5 If  Borgmann  pressed  hard  enough,  despite  all  of
Hickman’s insistence on the revisability of ends and ideals, I expect he would ultimately
stop the seeming valuational  regress by agreeing with Dewey’s cryptic assertion that
“[g]rowth  itself  is  the  only  moral  ‘end’”  (Dewey,  MW 12:  181),6 though  with  some
qualifications, including that “growth” can be tested ecologically7 and that “Dewey has
been massively misinterpreted on this score, as if he had some kind of fixed ideal which
would not yield to any kind of interpretation.”8 This difference with Borgmann reveals a
deep faith on Hickman’s side, shared with Dewey, that through a self-correcting process
of testing and revision, we will find worthwhile practices as well as criteria for evaluating
these practices.
23 There are dangers in failing to experiment with our ideals, an example of which Hickman
gives regarding Borgmann’s consistent return to the family as integral to focal practices.
A certain type of reverence for tradition and conservative practices often runs counter to
the meliorism and progressivism of American pragmatism. In our present culture, the
concept of “the family” is under significant and important revision, in part because of the
attestation  and  reason-giving  strategies  Borgmann  suggests,  but  also  because  of  the
results  of  informal  empirical-experiential  tests  as  well  as  structured  experimental
psychological  and health wellness  ones.9 Without allowing these modes of  inquiry to
count in all of our justificatory practices, including those related to focal practices, we
run the risk of falling into what I, generalizing from the work of Peirce, will call a kind of
“cultural tenacity.” There is no doubt that those things and practices Borgmann identifies
as focal have helped people, perhaps including himself, to live meaningful lives. This,
however,  is  no reason to think that inquiry and experimentation with new practices
should stop and all present-day people should ideally be cooking meals and taking up
long-distance running. Because of the social nature of human life, we of course learn
practices  from  one  another,  including  those  techniques  that  promise  us  significant
enrichment.  In admitting  this  sociality,  however,  we also  allow in  the  possibility  of
engaging in practices only because an authority insists on it, as in the case of Walmart
workers going through their daily mandated cheer,10 or because of a seemingly idealized
and  limited  judgment  that  microwaves  are  bad  and  ovens  are  good.  Borgmann’s
justification is at its best when he writes of attestation, which carries with it an appeal for
others to try something because they might like its consequences.  At the same time,
however,  it  must  be  admitted  that  this  is  an  invitation  to  a  kind  of  informal
experimentalism,  the successes  of  which can only be bolstered by inclusion of  more
formal testing.
24 The above should be enough to show that contrary to Mullis’s assertion, Hickman has
long  been  concerned  with  the  focaltechnic  element  of  Borgmann’s  thought.  Lurking
under all of Borgmann’s worry about the device paradigm, though, is the relationship
between ends and means,  a concern Mullis notes was also of  pressing importance to
Hickman’s philosophical progenitor, John Dewey. As Hickman has written extensively on
the relationship between means and ends in his pragmatic philosophy of technology, I
will draw on his work as well as Thomas M. Alexander’s rendering of pragmatic aesthetics
in order to undermine the criticism on which Mullis’s argument rests. Once again, this is
not merely an attempt to intervene in a debate in contemporary pragmatism, but rather
to highlight the stakes of the disagreement,  to weigh in on the relationship between
instrumentalism and aesthetics.
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John Dewey’s Aesthetic Instrumentalism
25 Borgmannites argue that the device paradigm is currently pervasive and exemplifies “the
manner in which devices separate means from ends” (Mullis, 2009: 112). Thinking back to
the first section, in which I gave a rough sketch of Borgmann’s position, use of the wall-
mounted thermostat  device sets  in motion all  sorts  of  means that  are necessary but
invisible to reaching one’s desired ends of warmth. On the other side of his distinction,
achieving warmth with a wood fire may require a careful progression of fully-engaged
means,  including tree-chopping and wood-hauling.  Mullis  links this  concern for  “the
interplay of ends and means, a movement to a culminating moment, and a pervasive
quality” with John Dewey’s writings on consummatory experience in Art as Experience
(Dewey, LW10).11 By now Dewey’s understanding of aesthetic experience has been well-
explored, so rather than attempting to blaze a new trail, I will briefly explain each of the
three components of an aesthetic moment with significant reference to relevant sections
of Hickman’s John Dewey’s Pragmatic Technology and Alexander’s John Dewey’s Theory of Art,
Experience, and Nature: The Horizons of Feeling.
26 By “pervasive quality,” Dewey meant “that which binds together all the defined elements,
the objects of which we are focally aware, making them a whole” (Dewey, LW10: 198),
Alexander explains this as the “ineffable unity of contexts of experience, an apprehension
which  locates  specific  objects  of  consciousness  within  a  whole  situation,  itself
immediately  grasped or  felt  to  be  balanced or  discordant”  (Alexander,  1987:  4).  Our
experiences “hang together in certain ways. An evening with friends may consist of many
factors;  but I  may say in retrospect that it  was stimulating,  or perhaps even boring”
(Hickman, 1990: 35). Each situation in which individuals find themselves has a general,
overarching feeling. Analogous to this are William James’s claims about the “stream of
thought” and the ways in which humans are able to experience and perceive conjunctive
relationships,  a  point  which  set  him in  opposition  to  the  predominantly  nominalistic
British empiricist tradition.12
27 Though all experiences have a pervasive quality, not all experiences are moving toward a
culminating moment. The majority of situations are quotidian, and routine cannot always
and does not easily give itself over to the potential for denouement. Those cases where
culmination  is  actual  Dewey refers  to  as  “an experience,”  for  means  and ends  have
become integrated such that “the possibility in nature for the fulfillment of value and
meaning” (Alexander, 1987: 102) is revealed. These cases are possible only if we are free
from “distraction and dispersion,” if  we do not have “what we observe and what we
think, what we desire and what we get… at odds with each other” (Dewey, LW10: 42). This
becomes possible relative to “the degree of the scope and intimacy of the interactions
realized” (Dewey, LW1: 201), which I take to be a statement of the importance of a tight
interplay  between  ends  and  means  as  a  necessary  precondition  for  achieving
consummatory experiences.
28 Dewey’s principle of continuity is of course of extreme relevance here; insofar as we are
able  to  recognize  and  to  accord  our  ends  with  our  means,  we  are  more  likely  to
experience consummation. Hoped-for consummation involves and requires recognition
of a situation’s qualitative feeling, because “part of the meaning of a situation involves
this drive toward wholeness, the attempt to mediate the problematic and transform it
into  the  consummatory”  (Alexander,  1987:  150).  Hickman  has  characterized  Dewey’s
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philosophy,  and especially his  theory of  inquiry,  as “an account of  the rhythms that
permeate  the  interaction  of  human  beings  in  and  with  their  various  experiences”
(Hickman,  1990:  60).  Insofar  as  situations  are  experienced  as  qualitatively  chaotic,
unsettled, and problematic, they are unconsummated, but these are also the situations
that  are  most  fertile  for  inquiry,  most  ready  to  be  made stable.  It  is  only  when an
individual’s habituated means become appropriate to the ends he or she desires, through
sheer  luck  or  a  process  of  transactional  inquiry,13 that  aesthetic  consummation  is
possible.
29 The  1903  Studies  in  Logical  Theory contains  an  interesting  little  paper  entitled  “The
Relationship of Thought and Its Subject-Matter,” in which Dewey describes
a certain rhythm of direct practice and derived theory; of primary construction and
of secondary criticism; of living appreciation and of abstract description; of active
endeavor and of pale reflection. We find that every more direct primary attitude
passes upon occasion into its secondary deliberative and discursive counterpart. We
find that when the latter has done its work it passes away and passes on. (Dewey,
MW2: 299)
30 This statement nicely links Dewey’s theory of inquiry with Peirce’s writings about the
“irritation of  doubt” as spurring investigation into the world,  an investigation which
abates and potentially ceases once the motivating doubt or problem has been resolved by
a belief’s being settled. Dewey’s notion of inquiry is phasic, but it occurs within a broader
context  of  continuous  experience.  Speaking  in  general  terms,  the  recognition  of  a
problematic  situation  temporarily  disrupts  the  non-cognitive,  habitual,  transactional
relationship  an  organism  has  with  his  or  her  environment.  Cognitive  inquiry  and
adjustment of practices are then performed in order to return the individual to stability.
These new practices and the results of these inquiries provide background conditions for
the organism’s newly-won but almost certainly temporary non-cognitive practice. This
Dewey terms “funded experience of the past,” but it can also be understood as playing a
role similar to tradition, as noted above.
31 Taken at an appropriate level of abstraction, I agree with Mullis about the connection
between Dewey’s aesthetics and Borgmann technological aim: Borgmann’s understanding
of  focal  things  as  unifying  and orienting  for  human lives  displays,  in  an  ideal  case,
pervasive  quality,  moving  toward  a  culminating  moment,  and  a  tight  relationship
between ends and means. Looking again to the woodsperson hunting warmth, one may
see an individual taking essential steps to prepare his or her situation for the culminating
moment:  the spark of  flame.  Unfortunately,  Mullis  does not stop at  this  consonance.
Instead, he presses the Borgmannian point that the device paradigm limits the possibility
of consummatory experiences.  Moreover,  he disappointingly places the blame for the
device-based ills of our contemporary culture squarely at the feet of instrumentalists like
Hickman and Dewey. This hasty judgment could not be more mistaken.
32 Mullis is careful to explain that, perhaps unlike Borgmann, he thinks “devices are not,
strictly speaking, antithetical to consummatory14 experience. That is, particular devices
such as my iPod or cell phone do not necessarily thwart enriching experience in which
means coalesce in fulfilling ends” (Mullis, 2009: 114). That movies and live and recorded
music are now readily available on such high-tech devices as computers is evidence in
favor of this: obvious aesthetic experiences that used to occur in the music hall can now
occur while sitting before an LCD screen. There are of course important social differences
in  these  experiences,  but  these  do  not  diminish  the  possibility  of  experiential
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consummation.  If  one  wishes  to  criticize  specific  devices,  he  or  she  must  do  so  in
reference to ends other than the immediately aesthetic. The tack he instead takes it to
move from the particular to the general; the issue is the predominance of devices, and
especially  their  habit  of  breaking apart  ends and means by obfuscating the involved
means. Mullis states his contention directly:
Since  the  device  paradigm  characterizes  much  of  everyday  life  and  since
consummatory experience and focal practices are contingent upon the integration
of  means and ends,  it  follows that  the device paradigm does interfere with the
cultivation and appreciation of consummatory experience. (Mullis, 2009: 115)
33 The  experiential  appeal  of  this  claim  is  significant.  Caricatured  images  of  obese
Americans clicking their  television remotes  while  sitting on computerized massaging
couches and eating microwave-heated chicken potpies come easily to mind, and books
like Huxley’s Brave New World have prepared contemporary American thinkers to worry
about just such a device-mediated future. Nonetheless, as should be obvious, this fear is
dependent on creeping back into exactly the same device property-essentialism about
which Hickman and Dewey have consistently warned their readers.
34 After summarizing Hickman’s anti-essentialist functionalist account, Mullis declares, “it
is  clear,  however,  that  the  devices  that  characterize  the  device  paradigm  do  have
something  of  an  essence”  (Mullis,  2009:  116).  This  statement  is  problematic,  in  part
because  it  lacks  argumentation  except  for  that  offered  earlier  in  summarizing
Borgmann’s philosophy. More than this, the use of the phrase “something of an essence”
is ambiguous. On one reading, this is an endorsement of Hickman’s functionalist rejection
of fixed essences. Unfortunately, this is not what he means. Rather, as he lets on in the
next sentence, “[t]his is not to say that one can make a universal claim about all devices,
but it is to say that devices enforce the separation of means from ends.” If Mullis were to
have  included  a  contextualist  phrase  such  as  “currently,  in  our  situation”  in  this
explanation, then it would be helpful. As he did not, however, it is an example of either a
trivial or question-begging assertion.
35 This judgment is amplified when, in the next line, Mullis writes, “a pure instrumentalism
is  impossible.”  Well,  yes.  But  it  is  unclear  what  makes an instrumentalism pure and
especially how Dewey’s position could ever be understood in this way. After all, in a 1940
letter to Corliss Lamont,  Dewey wrote,  “I  have come to think of my own position as
cultural  or  humanistic  Naturalism….  Of  course  I  have  always  limited  my  use  of
‘instrumentalism’ to my theory of thinking and knowledge” (Lamont, 1961: 26). Perhaps
Mullis  is  conflating  Dewey’s  instrumentalism  with  the  “naïve”  or  “straight-line”
instrumentalism which Hickman has so often challenged as incomplete and incompatible
with Dewey’s broader commitments.15
36 In preparing for his conclusion, Mullis states, “Modern technological artifacts can shape
experience as they separate means from ends and influence the appreciation of focal
things and practices and the cultivation of  consummatory experience more generally”
(Mullis, 2009: 116). This sentence is correct but not worded strongly enough for Mullis to
support  his  final  accusation  that  “a  thorough  consideration  of  the  device  paradigm
reveals an inconsistency in Dewey’s philosophy. Dewey’s instrumentalism is at odds with
his  account  of  consummatory  experience  since  the  proliferation  of  devices  is  an
expression  of  instrumentalism  and  since  devices  can  hinder  the  development  of
consummatory experience.” For this to work, Mullis would need to establish that modern
technological artifacts must, not just can, separate means from ends. And this would be to
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join Borgmann in “believ[ing] that information technology determines human behavior,”
a reductionism with which he seemed initially uncomfortable and which he avoids in his
conclusion by stating that devices are in fact not determinative of experience.
37 The accusation that Dewey’s aesthetic philosophy is inconsistent with his philosophy of
technology  is  not  a  new  one.  In  fact,  Alexander’s  important  1987  book  on  Dewey’s
aesthetics is centrally concerned with replying to “why [Stephen] Pepper, [Benedetto]
Croce, and George H. Douglas believed that some or all of the tenets of Art as Experience
are  inconsistent  with  Dewey’s  naturalistic  instrumentalism”  (Alexander,  1987:  2).
Alexander  argues  that  their  mid-twentieth  century  criticisms  were  motivated  by  a
misunderstanding of Dewey’s theory of aesthetic meaning.  It  seems that Eric Mullis’s
recent  assault  came  about  from  a  similar  misunderstanding,  which  resulted  in
overextension and segmentation of the instrumental component of Dewey’s thought at
the  expense  of  recognizing  its  continuity  with  the  aesthetic  element  of  his  broader
philosophy.16
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NOTES
1. For a fuller discussion, see Borgmann (1992, esp. 37-47).
2. And, despite the obvious segmentation and specificity of use, these assumed “devices” are
likely much closer to being Borgmannian things than many other tools.
3. It is notable that most of the things Borgmann terms focal are, from an ordinary perspective,
antiquated, and he has been extensively criticized for romanticizing the past. See, for example,
Fallman (2007) and Verbeek (2002).
4. I was surprised to see that Mullis’s 2009 essay referred only to Hickman’s 1990 John Dewey’s
Pragmatic  Technology and 2001 Philosophical  Tools  for  Technological  Culture:  Putting Pragmatism to
Work,  because the 2000 essay seems to be explicitly on point and thus to preempt and defuse
much of the criticism presented.
5. His internal citation is to Crossing the Postmodern Divide. On this metaphilosophical claim,
Borgmann seems to be allied with the neopragmatism of Richard Rorty, another thinker whose
ethical  thought  Hickman finds  to  be  insufficiently  experimental,  cf.  the  concluding pages  of
Rorty (2007) and Hickman (2001, esp. 89-90).
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6. Dewey’s works employed in this essay are referred to by series designation, volume number,
and page number. All of these are found in the critical edition, Boydston J. A. ed., (1969-91), The
Collected Works of John Dewey, 1882–1953, Carbondale, Southern Illinois University Press.
7. Cf.  Flanagan  O.  J.  Jr.,  (1996),  “Ethics  Naturalized:  Ethics  and  Human  Ecology,”  in  May  L.,
Friedman M. & Clark A. eds.,  Mind and Morals:  Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science,  Cambridge
(MA), MIT Press, 19-44.
8. Hickman L. “Education as Growth,” Interview. The Cologne Video Project and the Dialogue between
Pragmatism and Constructivism. Available online, [hf.uni-koeln.de/30941video355].
9. Hickman (2000: 102-104).
10. “Give me a W! … Give me an A!,” etc. For more, see [wal-martchina.com/english/walmart/
rule/wmcheer.htm].
11. Mullis points to pp. 30-46 to make his argument, but the details of consummatory experience
are peppered throughout the text.
12. See James (1912) and (1985); see also Johnson (2007).
13. Much more could be said about the particulars of Dewey’s theory of inquiry than what I am
going to offer here, but to avoid wandering too far afield, and in the interest of brevity, I will
refer interested readers to the relevant sections – and there are many – of Hickman’s texts.
14. Throughout Mullis’s piece, the word “consummatory” is spelled “consumatory.” Rather than
note ‘sic’ after each instance, I have simply modified the spelling.
15. See, for instance, Hickman (1990: 148-49); Hickman (2001: 72-3, 157-58).
16. In  fact,  one  of  Hickman’s  most  recent  essays  is  centrally  addressed  to  this  concern.  By
offering  a  brief,  Deweyan  account  of  “quotidian  aesthetics,”  the  piece  argues  again  for  the
reciprocal  continuity  between  aesthetics  and  instrumentalism,  consummation  and
understanding. See Hickman (2013), especially the suggestive reference to Experience and Nature
in the piece’s penultimate paragraph.
ABSTRACTS
Larry A. Hickman and Albert Borgmann have carried on a decades-long debate about the status
and value of technological practices. Hickman’s work develops from the thought of John Dewey.
A  recent  essay  alleges  that  Hickman’s  engagement  with  Borgmann  has  been  superficial,
particularly  because  full  engagement would  involve  admitting  that  Dewey’s  instrumentalist
theory of inquiry and his aesthetics are at odds. This paper argues not only that Hickman has
attended to the full scope of Borgmann’s thought but also that Dewey is innocent of the criticism
charged. Along the way, I develop a critique of the traditionalistic nostalgia implicit in accounts
like Borgmann’s. This all serves to address the longstanding concern that pragmatism can be
reduced to a crass form of instrumentalism.
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